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THE INHERITANCE OF INEQUALITY:
HUKOU AND RELATED BARRIERS TO COMPULSORY
EDUCATION FOR CHINA’S MIGRANT CHILDREN
Jessica L. Montgomery†
Abstract: The hukou system in China uses residency permits to divide Chinese
citizens into urban and rural dwellers. A person’s hukou status determines his or her
access to state services. Under normal circumstances, a person with a rural hukou status
is not eligible for state services in urban areas, and vice versa. Because hukou is
primarily inherited from one’s parents at the time of birth, children born in urban areas to
parents with rural hukou are similarly designated as rural hukou holders. As a result,
children living in cities with rural hukou are ineligible for enrollment in urban public
schools even if they were born within the district. This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that a massive number of people are engaged in rural-urban migration in China each
year. The central government has promulgated numerous laws and regulations in an
attempt to grant these migrant children free access to urban public schools, but most local
governments have been hesitant to implement the changes. Further, as a prerequisite to
enrollment, urban public schools commonly require excessive amounts of documentation
and charge expensive fees that make public education inaccessible to migrant families.
This comment argues that to fix the current problems with hukou and educational access,
the central government needs to clarify the responsibilities of local governments in
administrating public education and should devote more funding to urban and rural
schools. Both of these measures would encourage local officials to comply with existing
education laws regarding migrant children. Additionally, the central government must
encourage stricter enforcement of relevant laws in order to incentivize local compliance.
Making these changes will have long-term political and economic benefits for China
because educating this large group of children can soothe social tensions in cities, lessen
income inequality, and facilitate China’s transition to a service-based economy.

I.

INTRODUCTION

China’s rapid urbanization and robust economic growth have spurred
a massive internal migration from rural villages to urban centers. Rural
residents move to cities to take advantage of diverse employment
opportunities, higher wages, and higher standards of living. However, rural
migrants face a serious institutional barrier upon their arrival: the hukou
system.
The hukou system, sometimes referred to as “household
registration,” separates Chinese citizens into urban and rural residents—a
distinction that carries social, economic, and political implications.1
†
Juris Doctor expected in 2013, LL.M expected in 2014, University of Washington School of Law.
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Kam Wing Chan, The Household Registration System and Migrant Labor in China: Notes on a
Debate, 36(2) POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 357, 357 (2010), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/kw
chan/Chan-hukou.pdf.
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China implemented its modern hukou system in the 1950s to carry out
two main functions: controlling rural-urban migration and determining
access to social services. 2 It also serves an administrative purpose by
providing the government with census-like information that can be used for
various social and political objectives.3 The hukou system has undergone
many reforms since its inception, 4 but the system still serves these same
basic purposes. The People’s Republic of China established the modern
hukou system during a time when cooperative living was the norm and the
state controlled all aspects of industry and commerce. 5 At the height of
central planning, the hukou system played an important and sensible role in
controlling the population’s mobility. 6 However, as a result of the more
market-oriented policies China has embraced in the past several decades, the
hukou system, which continues to control mobility and opportunity for urban
and rural residents,7 is increasingly out of touch with the country’s current
sociopolitical structure.
The hukou system has been accused of many things: creating a ruralurban apartheid, building cities with invisible walls, and discriminating
against the same workers who made China’s economic boom possible. 8
Many criticisms of the hukou system are based on its effects on access to
social services, such as education. As a result of this relationship, the large
populations of rural migrant children living in Chinese cities without urban
hukou are effectively shut out of the public school system with few other
viable options. 9 This comment will examine the legal framework
surrounding the education of rural hukou-holding children living in China’s
cities (hereafter referred to as “migrant children”) and set forth suggestions
for fixing the current inequity in compulsory education.
The hukou system is not applied evenhandedly across China. After
years of reforms, local governments now exercise significant discretion over
2

Id. at 358.
Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang, The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China:
Processes
and
Changes,
160
CHINA
Q.
818,
818-19
(1999),
available
at
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=3526968.
4
Chan, supra note 1, at 358-59.
5
Tiejin Cheng & Mark Selden, The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s Hukou System,
139 THE CHINA Q. 644, 652-53 (1994).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Kam Wing Chan & Will Buckingham, Is China Abolishing the Hukou
System?, 195 THE CHINAQ., 582, 582 (2008), available at http://www.willamette.edu/cla/debate/Curriculu
m/YouthForum2010/MTTResearch/RoleofGovernment/Anca_Abolishing%20the%20Hukou%20system.pd
f.
9
Tania Branigan, Millions of Chinese Rural Migrants Denied Education for Their Children, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 14, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/15/china-migrant-workers-children
-education.
3
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hukou policy, leading certain cities to adopt differing standards to acquire
urban hukou.10 It is important to keep this in mind because although this
comment makes generalizations about hukou policy and its implications,
policies across China differ, especially as they relate to education and
treatment of migrant children.
Growing decentralization of school administration has compromised
national legislative measures to improve educational access to migrant
children. Although the central government revised the Compulsory
Education Act in 2006 to ensure rural migrant children free access to
compulsory education (encompassing six years of primary and three years of
junior secondary education) in state schools, wide-scale demolition of
private schools continues while migrant children are still turned away from
the state school system in large numbers.11 It is in China’s economic and
political interest to incorporate migrant children into the state’s compulsory
education system, but the central government must overcome the barriers
that decentralization presents in order to realize this goal.
Migrant workers already feel mistreated by the state, resulting in
social unrest that can be witnessed across China. 12 If the government
continues to deny educational opportunities to migrant children, it is likely
to fuel further social turmoil. Social unrest among migrant workers also
exists because China is moving away from an economy based on low-cost
manufacturing.
This transition is partially due to skyrocketing
manufacturing costs, which are fueled by labor shortages and demands for
higher wages to offset rapid increases in food and property prices.13 This
rise in manufacturing costs has already led some factories to relocate to
lower-wage countries. 14 The Chinese government itself accedes that the
country is moving toward a service-based economy. 15 Connecting the
10

Id.
Luisetta Mudie, Anger Over Migrant School Closures, RADIO FREE ASIA, Aug. 18, 2011,
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/closures-08182011110322.html; Josh Chin, Will School Closures
Prompt Migrants to Flee?, WALL ST. J. CHINA REAL TIME REPORT, Aug. 19, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/ch
inarealtime/2011/08/19/will-school-closures-prompt-migrants-to-flee/.
12
China
Migrant
Workers
Clash
with
Police
for
Third
Night,
BBC NEWS: ASIA PACIFIC, June 13, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13746989; Jamil
Anderlini, Unrest spreads among China’s migrant masses, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 17, 2011, http://www.ft
.com/intl/cms/s/0/e0696f2c-98f9-11e0-acd2-00144feab49a.html#axzz1bf0AoPCy.
13
David Barboza, China Shifts Away From Low-Cost Factories, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/business/global/16factory.html?pagewanted=1.
14
Id.
15
Li Mu, China May Develop Service Economy in 5 Years, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Oct. 9, 2010,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7161177.html (“China's service sector accounted for
a 42.6 percent share of China's GDP in the first half of this year, representing a 1.3 percent increase. The
growth is expected to continue, and it will surpass the industry sector share by 2015, the last year of
China’s 12th Five-Year Plan.”).
11
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concepts of education and economic transition, a recent World Bank report
stated: “Producing services tends to require relatively less natural capital
and more human capital than producing agricultural or industrial goods. As
a result demand has grown for more educated workers, prompting countries
to invest more in education—an overall benefit to their people.”16 China’s
economy will benefit when it incorporates migrant children into the state
school system. It will be able to compete internationally as a service-based
economy, and it will allocate fewer resources to public security to handle
social unrest stemming from the grievances of migrant workers.
Part II of this comment discusses three issues: 1) a brief overview of
the hukou system in China, 2) the significance of hukou policy and ruralurban migration, and 3) the hardships migrant workers and their children
face trying to access social services in the cities where they have moved.
Part III examines the legal and social frameworks surrounding education in
China and makes the case that the current legal and social frameworks do
not adequately protect migrant children’s rights to attend urban public
schools. Part IV argues that fully incorporating migrant children into the
state school system will bring political and economic benefits to China.
Finally, Part V details the steps that the central and local governments should
take to ensure access to state schools for migrant children. These steps
include introducing more detailed rules on enrollment of migrant children,
stepping up enforcement of existing education laws, and boosting education
spending in rural and urban areas.
II.

HUKOU POLICY IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF
PEOPLE ENGAGED IN RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND BECAUSE IT
DETERMINES ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES

This Part explains the significance of hukou policy in modern China
as it relates to migrant children and argues that it is unreasonably difficult
for migrant children to access state education in the cities where they live.
Rural-urban migration is a common undertaking in modern China. The
McKinsey Global Institute, which collects global demographic statistics,
estimates that between 1990 and 2005, 103 million Chinese people migrated
from rural to urban areas.17 In large eastern cities like Beijing and Shanghai,
the migrant work force is estimated to make up over one quarter of the
16

TATYANA P. SOUBBOTINA, BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH 52 (The World Bank eds., 2d ed. 2004),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/beyond/beyond.htm.
17
McKinsey & Co., Preparing for China's Urban Billion 18 (2009),
http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Urbanization/Preparing_for_urban_billion_in_China.
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population. 18 Some cities in the southern Pearl River Delta region,
commonly known as “the world’s factory,” have even larger populations of
migrant workers. In 2005, the mayor of Dongguan suggested that the city
had close to 10 million migrant workers, in contrast to the 1.7 million local
residents recorded by an earlier census.19 The National Statistics Bureau
reported that at the end of 2009, China had a total of 229.8 million rural
migrant workers.20 Additionally, recent reports from the National Bureau of
Statistics show that urban dwellers account for 51.27% of China’s
population, showing that this trend of urbanization is still increasing. 21
Perhaps more important, today migrant workers stay for longer periods of
time in the cities where they have moved.22 Also, 60% of migrant workers
in China now move with their children.23 In Henan, China’s second-most
populated province, the number of migrant children increased by roughly
25% each year from 2000 to 2006.24
There are many reasons why migrant workers choose to move away
from their hometowns, but some reasons are more pervasive than others.
Many migrant workers associate their rural hometowns with poverty and
backwardness, seeing cities as gateways to more modern and privileged
lifestyles.25 Today’s migrant workers tend to be younger and better educated
than those who stay behind in rural areas.26 The process of migrating from
rural to urban centers in China is called chuqu (literally translated as “going
out”).27 Many migrant workers decide to engage in chuqu because there are
relatively few opportunities for young people in rural China. 28 Often,
migrant workers move to a location after hearing about job openings from
friends, relatives, or fellow villagers.29 Today, migrant workers are typically
found in several industries: manufacturing, food service, delivery service,
housecleaning, childcare, garbage collection, personal hygiene, and
18

LESLIE CHANG, FACTORY GIRLS 11-12.
Id. at 20.
20
China Rural Migrant Workers Number Nearly 230 Million, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Mar. 24,
2010, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6929156.html.
21
Jeremy Page, Bob Davis, & James Areddy, China Turns Predominately Urban, WALL ST. J. ASIA,
Jan. 18, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203735304577166652002366514.html?mo
d=googlenews_wsj.
22
China's 'Floating Population' Exceeds 221 Mln, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Mar. 1, 2011,
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7303707.html.
23
Id.
24
The Children of Migrant Workers in China, CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, May 8, 2009, available at
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/100460#part2_archor03.
25
CHANG, supra note 18, at 8-9.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 11.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 12.
19
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prostitution. 30 Though the cities provide many more opportunities for
migrant workers, the work is often hard, the wages are frequently below
minimum wage, and it is not uncommon for work shifts to push well beyond
legal limits.31
A.

The Hukou System Creates Three Distinct Social Classes and
Provides Unequal Access to Education

This Section briefly explains the structure and implications of hukou
policy in China, focusing on its relation to educational access. Two
components determine a person’s hukou classification: place of hukou
registration (“hukou suozaidi”) and type of hukou registration (“hukou
leibie”). 32 The place of hukou registration controls a person’s rights to
engage in certain economic activities in an area and is based on a person’s
permanent place of residence (urban or rural). 33 An individual’s type of
hukou registration, however, does not depend on a person’s place of
residence—instead it is inherited, typically from one’s parents.34 The type of
hukou registration a person has, either agricultural or non-agricultural,
determines one’s socioeconomic eligibility within the state.35 A person must
seek government approval to change his or her hukou classification;
however, strict government policies and quotas micromanage urban-rural
migration and greatly complicate any change in status.36
The hukou system essentially creates three tiers of society in Chinese
cities. The first tier is comprised of those with full urban hukou.37 The
second tier includes people who have managed to acquire urban residency
by changing their place of hukou (hukou suozaidi), but still retain their rural
hukou type (hukou leibie).38 This group is commonly referred to as having
“mixed status.” The third tier is occupied by those with full rural hukou.39
This third group is often called China’s “floating population.”40

30

Id.
CHANG, supra note 18, at 11.
32
Chan and Zhang, supra note 3, at 821-26.
33
Id. at 821-22.
34
Id. at 822.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 823, 827-29
37
DONALD TREIMAN & ZHUONI ZHANG, SOCIAL ORIGINS, HUKOU, CONVERSION, AND THE
WELLBEING OF URBAN RESIDENTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 4 (Cal. Center for Population Research,
2011), available at http://www.pop.upenn.edu/sites/www.pop.upenn.edu/files/Zhang_Treiman_0.pdf.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 8.
31
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The “floating population” is primarily comprised of uneducated lowincome workers,41 but its broad definition may also encompass those with
college degrees who have moved away from their home provinces in search
of white-collar work. The mixed population still faces institutional hukoubased barriers, but generally has more advantages because of its local
residency rights than those with full rural hukou.42 Scholars Donald Treiman
and Zhuoni Zhang note that “[a]ccess to public schools, health care, and
certain types of housing, jobs, and insurance are either restricted to local
residents or are more limited and more expensive for those lacking local
registration, which usually is impossible to obtain without obtaining an
urban [hukou].”43 This comment will use the term “rural hukou” to describe
those in the second and third tiers.
Under normal circumstances, children inherit their hukou
classifications from their parents at their time of birth, and migrant parents
are often living in cities without the proper urban hukou necessary for access
to state services such as health care and education.44 Once born with rural
hukou classification, these migrant children will similarly face problems
accessing state services in urban areas. To frame the scale of this issue, it is
estimated that approximately 19 million migrant children are currently living
in China’s cities.45 A journalist reporting on migrant children noted:
Chinese children are entitled to a state education, but not all of
them get one. And the tens of millions born to migrant workers
. . . are among the most vulnerable, owing to a registration
system that divides the country’s citizens into rural and urban
dwellers, and dictates their rights accordingly.46
Migrant children face difficulties accessing state education for several
reasons. Urban public schools often receive no additional funding from the
central government for these children, so many of them are turned away
even if their parents can afford to pay the exorbitant “donations” some
schools charge to admit migrant children who meet the designated criteria.47
41
Education Level of Young Chinese Migrant Workers "Significantly Raised,” XINHUA, Dec. 9,
2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/09/c_131181582.htm.
42
TREIMAN & ZHANG, supra note 37, at 5.
43
Id. at 8.
44
Tania Branigan, Millions of Chinese Rural Migrants Denied Education for Their Children, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 14, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/15/china-migrant-workerschildren-education.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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Many migrant families turn to private schools to educate their children, but
local governments consistently demolish these institutions in the name of
urban development.48
B.

Current Policy Makes it Difficult for Rural Migrant Workers and
Their Children to Obtain Urban Hukou Status and to Access Social
Services in Cities

A person needs to seek government approval to change his or her
place and type of hukou registration.49 Hukou reforms over the past two
decades have resulted in local governments asserting more control over
hukou administration and management. 50 Local governments now have a
high degree of control over hukou criteria in their jurisdictions, both in terms
of the type and number of people accepted.51 As a result, local governments
in urban areas tend to give preferential treatment to those applicants who can
meet certain levels of wealth or education.52 This makes sense on some
level—with excess money to invest and marketable human capital, the
educated rich would constitute valuable economic assets to any city.
However, the educated rich do not tend to work in manufacturing, childcare,
construction, sanitation, or food service, industries vital to the functioning of
any modern Chinese city. Instead, these jobs fall to migrant workers.53
The process of transferring one’s type of registration (hukou leibie)
from agricultural to non-agricultural is referred to as nongzhuanfei and
determines one’s entitlement status in a given locality.54 Nongzhuanfei is
simply unattainable for most migrant workers because they cannot live up to
the various official and unofficial standards that local governments
promulgate, including requirements that applicants pay fees, present a
multitude of documents, and use guanxi (personal connections one can draw
upon for favors), which many migrant workers do not have.55 While some
migrant workers receive temporary residency, this classification typically
does not in itself grant access to social services such as education. 56
According to a 2007 study by Amnesty International that examined
48

Id.
Chan & Zhang, supra note 3, at 823.
Chan, supra note 1, at 361.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
CHANG, supra note 18, at 8-9.
54
Chan & Zhang, supra note 3, at 822-24.
55
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNAL MIGRANTS: DISCRIMINATION AND ABUSE. THE HUMAN
COST OF AN ECONOMIC ‘MIRACLE,’ § II, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/00
8/2007/en /c28868de-d3af-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/asa170082007en.html.
56
Id. §VII.
49
50
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eligibility standards in localities across China, “the vast majority of internal
migrants are unable to obtain permanent urban hukou.”57
Again, children’s hukou designations do not stem from their city of birth,
but rather from their parents’ statuses,58 which means that the children of
migrant workers also lack access to crucial social services such as education.
Numbers released in 2010 by the Beijing Bureau of Statistics revealed that
240,000 children between ages 6-14 were living in Beijing without
permanent residency, almost a 20% increase from numbers collected in
2000. 59 Despite the measures that have been taken to improve this
population’s access to urban public schools, the problem continues to exist.
C.

Children with Rural Hukou Registration Face Tremendous Challenges
in Accessing State Education in the Cities Where They Live

Numerous laws and State Council directives (the State Council is an
executive body of the government) command local governments to educate
the migrant children living within their jurisdictions. 60 However, these
commands lack adequate funding, and local governments have interpreted
them in ways that minimize their responsibility to educate migrant
children. 61 Many of these laws and directives broadly state that migrant
children should not pay additional fees to attend urban public schools, but
these statements have not prompted much on-the-ground improvement. 62
Despite the fact that the Compulsory Education Law seems to guarantee free
compulsory education to all school-age children in China,63 in 2004 tuition
and miscellaneous fees made up 18.59% of total expenditures on education
in the country.64 This burden tends to fall the hardest on migrant children.65
At one time, public schools in Shandong province charged students without
57

Id.
Id.
59
Schools for Migrant Workers’ Children Torn Down, CHINA DAILY WEIBO BUZZ, Aug. 19 2011,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-08/19/content_13150732.htm.
60
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, CHINA’S HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION
SYSTEM: SUSTAINED REFORM NEEDED TO PROTECT CHINA’S RURAL MIGRANTS 4-7 (2005), available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/news/hukou.pdf.
61
Id. at 7.
62
HAN JIALING, EDUCATION FOR MIGRANT CHILDREN IN CHINA 9 (2009), available at http://ddpext.worldbank.org/EdStats/CHNgmrpap09.pdf.
63
Compulsory Education Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Nat’l People’s
Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2006, effective Sept.
1, 2006), art. 2, (2006) (China) (though after the 2006 amendments to the Compulsory Education Act, these
numbers could potentially have improved).
64
EMILY C. HANNUM, JERE BEHRMAN, MEIYAN WANG, & JIHONG LIU, EDUCATION IN THE REFORM
ERA 41 (2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/emily_hannum/10.
65
Branigan, supra note 9.
58
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local hukou registration 300 to 500 yuan (approximately $50-80 United
States dollars “USD”) per semester in additional fees, not including fees
charged to the entire student body.66 In 2011, the average monthly salary of
a migrant worker was approximately 1,690 yuan (approximately $260 USD)
per month, 67 a 19% increase from numbers reported in 2009. 68 While
schools in some large cities like Beijing and Chongqing have scaled back the
additional fees required to admit migrant children,69 financial requisites for
admission still tend to be higher for migrant children.70
Because local governments typically do not receive additional funding
from the central government to accommodate these children, they often lack
the infrastructure and resources to educate all the school-age children living
in their jurisdictions.71 In an attempt to make up for budget shortfalls, some
administrators charge illicit “donations” to admit migrant children, which
the typical migrant family cannot afford.72
Apart from up-front fees, other factors make public education
inaccessible to many migrant families. Guanxi (personal connections) are
often necessary for admittance, and many migrant workers lack the social
networks and financial capacity to establish the guanxi needed to get their
children enrolled.73 In addition, many urban public schools require parents
to provide certain documents (typically known as the “five key governmentissued documents” or the “five certificates”), including formal employment
contracts (or employment certificates) and temporary residence permits, as a
prerequisite to enrollment.74 This requirement does not take into account the
practical realities of life as a migrant worker. Many migrant parents work in
informal environments where labor contracts are not used.75 In 2004, only
an estimated 21% of migrant workers had labor contracts with their
employers.76 While new legislation in 2007 put more pressure on employers
to use labor contracts, this remains a serious problem facing migrant workers

66

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, supra note 60, at 8.
Li Yancheng, Average Monthly Income of Migrant Workers Reaches 1,690 Yuan, PEOPLE’S DAILY
ONLINE, Mar. 23, 2011, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7329296.html.
68
Id.
69
HAN, supra note 62, at 10.
70
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, supra note 60, at 8.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.; Branigan, supra note 9; See also HAN, supra note 62, at 6-7 (discussing the “five certificate
system” and its administration).
75
Branigan, supra note 9; Mudie, supra note 11.
76
Andrew Scheineson, China’s Internal Migrants, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, May 14, 2009,
http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-internal-migrants/p12943#p4.
67
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today.77 Also, studies indicate that approximately one-third of the migrant
worker population is self-employed.78 Thus, an overwhelming majority of
the migrant workforce lacks the necessary documentation to enroll their
children in urban public schools.
D.

Private Schools for Migrant Children Exist but Often Provide Sub-Par
Education and Frequently Face Demolition by Local Governments

Private schools for migrant children have been established in many
Chinese cities but continue to face significant problems.79 First, they must
charge tuition in order to operate, and sometimes charge as much as state
schools for enrollment.80 In early 2009, Tangsi Primary School, a migrant
school in Shanghai, charged 550 yuan (approximately $95 USD) per
semester for books and tuition. 81 As previously stated, most migrant
workers have limited finances and cannot afford to pay that high of tuition.
Second, the state frequently demolishes these schools in the name of urban
development, lack of accreditation, or health or safety violations. 82 This
interrupts the students’ educational trajectories and again sends them
searching for alternative educational opportunities. 83 Third, while some
private migrant schools provide a quality education, many are low-quality
institutions merely created to turn a profit off migrant workers with limited
options and are staffed by inexperienced teachers.84
Some migrant children have benefitted from private schools, such as
in Shanghai where the government has increasingly supported these
institutions with periodic appropriations and legal protections.85 However,
the existence of private institutions does not and should not alleviate the
government’s responsibility to provide free and accessible compulsory
education to all Chinese children.
Despite the relative success of migrant schools in Shanghai, these
successes are not shared across the country. Private schools for migrant
77
Id.; CHINA DAILY WEIBO BUZZ, supra note 59 (comments of Wangzhian, commentator for China
Central Television).
78
Xiaoming Li, Bonita Stanton, Xiaoyi Fang & Danhua Lin, Social Stigma and Mental Health
among Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China: A Conceptual Framework and Future Research Needs, 8(3)
WORLD HEALTH & POPULATION 14, ¶ 16 (2006), http://www.longwoods.com/content/18282.
79
Branigan, supra note 9.
80
Id.; See also CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, supra note 60, at 8 (discussing
school fees for migrant children).
81
Chen Weihua, Migrant Children Also Need Schools to Study, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 3, 2009, at 8.
82
Branigan, supra note 9; Mudie, supra note 11.
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Branigan, supra note 9.
84
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85
Weihua, supra note 81.
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children often employ unlicensed teachers and are located in undesirable and
potentially dangerous locations like factory buildings, old apartments, and
warehouses.86 Migrant schools across the country still face the threat of
random and arbitrary demolitions. 87 While local governments frequently
claim that demolitions will be accompanied by wider inclusion of migrant
children in state schools, limited capacity, limited funding, and the inability
of migrant parents to gather the “five certificates” necessary for enrollment
prevent these promises from being fully realized.88
III.

THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK SURROUNDING THE PROVISION
STATE EDUCATION IN CHINA FAILS TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS
MIGRANT CHILDREN

OF
OF

This Part discusses the current legal framework surrounding
compulsory education in China and attempts to explain why it falls short of
being effective. Several Chinese laws and regulations, on their face, seem to
guarantee free compulsory education to all Chinese children.89 Yet a close
inspection of the legal framework shows a more complex picture. Five main
sources of law affect compulsory education in China: the Constitution, the
Education Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Education Law”), State
Council directives, the Compulsory Education Act (“CEA”), and various
local regulations. These sources of law will be discussed in turn. This Part
also argues that integrating migrant children into the state school system will
have several positive effects, many of which align with the country’s own
stated policy goals.
The Chinese Constitution addresses the provision of education,
though it does so in vague terms.90 Article 46 establishes that “[c]itizens of
the People's Republic of China have the duty as well as the right to receive
education.”91
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Id.
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The Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted by the
National People’s Congress (“NPC”) in 1985, gives a clearer picture of how
the educational system is to be managed in practice.92 It provides that the
State Council and local governments should guide and administer education
with a suitable division of responsibilities. 93 The result is that the State
Council is responsible for the overall planning, coordination, and
management of education while local administrative departments of
education take responsibility for on-the-ground educational activities in their
respective regions.94
The Ministry of Education, a department within the State Council, is
the highest administrative educational body in China and is responsible for
guiding the compulsory education system.95 More specifically, the Ministry
of Education manages educational funds and inspects and evaluates
compulsory education programs. 96 However, following the trend of
decentralization embodied by the Education Law, local governments largely
manage the administration of compulsory education.97 Decentralization of
the administration and financing of education has increased extra-budgetary
spending because it allows local governments to use non-traditional
resources like student fees, though these gains have been largely confined to
urban areas where there is more wealth. 98 In line with this increase,
government appropriations for compulsory education have also decreased
significantly since the early 1990s, dropping over 20% between 1991 and
2004.99 Though decentralization may effectively boost education spending
in certain pockets of the country, it has also allowed local governments to
counteract the central government’s policy goals with few consequences. As
discussed below, decentralization presents one of the most significant
obstacles to an equitable application of education laws to migrant children
because it gives local governments too much unchecked discretion.100
While the Constitution and the Education Law make general
statements about the administration and availability of education, State
92
Education Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by Pres., Mar. 18, 1998, adopted
by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 18, 1995, effective Sept. 1, 1995) (1995) (China), available at
http://202.205.177.9/english/laws_e.htm.
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UNESCO-IBE, WORLD DATA ON EDUCATION 4 (7th ed. 2011), available at
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/ user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/China.pdf.
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Id.
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Id. at 5.
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MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION,
http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_2797/200907/49988.html.
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Council directives, the CEA, and local regulations more specifically detail
the rights of children and the responsibilities of administrators. These three
sources of law are discussed in more detail below.
A.

State Council Directives Issued Over the Past Decade Have
Emphasized the Importance of Providing Education to Migrant
Children

The State Council is the highest executive organ of state power in
China and has the power to carry out the principles and policies of the
Communist Party, effectuate laws and regulations adopted by the NPC, and
handle issues such as finance and education.101 The State Council can issue
directives that have compulsory effects similar to laws adopted by the
NPC.102 The State Council and the ministries, commissions, and bureaus
subordinate to it have the power to issue laws, regulations, and orders that
are characterized as legislative in nature.103 Administrative agencies under
the State Council, such as the Ministry of Education, are authorized to
implement rules that are necessary for them to carry out their responsibilities
in their designated areas.104
The State Council has issued three relevant directives in the past
several years: the “Decision on Reforming and Developing Elementary
Education” in 2001, “Ideas on How to Do Well with Migrant Children’s
Compulsory Education Further” in 2002, and “Ideas on Resolving Issues of
Migrant Workers” in 2006. 105 These directives all share the same
sentiment—that migrant children are entitled to nine years of compulsory
education and that local governments need to take responsibility for
educating the migrant children who live within their jurisdictions.106 The
2006 directive explicitly denounces the practice of charging additional
enrollment fees for migrant students in public schools, but mentions no
penalties for noncompliance.107
While these directives represent high aspirations, they were largely
ineffective in granting migrant children access to urban public schools.
Local governments often interpreted these vague directives in ways that
101

The State Council, GOV.CN, http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20763.htm.
CHINA LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF FOODS, DRUGS, AND COSMETICS, RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY,
http://www.chinafdc-law.com/glossary.html#49 (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
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Press 1999).
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minimized their responsibility for educating migrant children or ignored
them altogether.108 Further, the directives did not include funding, likely
making the State Council’s goals impracticable.109
B.

The Compulsory Education Act Provided Migrant Children More
Protection on Paper, but Has Not Significantly Improved Access to
State Schools

The Compulsory Education Act (“CEA”) was adopted in 1986 and
established a compulsory education system composed of primary and junior
secondary education.110 According to the CEA, all Chinese children of the
requisite age are entitled to nine years of compulsory education.111 Article 2
of the CEA provides that “[n]o tuition or miscellaneous fees may be charged
in the implementation of compulsory education” and that “[t]he State shall
establish a guarantee mechanism for operating funds for compulsory
education, in order to ensure implementation of the system of compulsory
education.”112
The CEA was amended in 2006 to better address the needs of migrant
children.113 Specifically, the amendment “stipulates that when both parents
or legal guardians are migrant workers living and working with their
children in locations other than where the family is registered, local
governments where they live and work must provide for the child's
education.”114 Article 12 of the revised CEA reads,
For school-age children and juveniles [sic] whose parents are
working or dwelling at a place other than their permanent
residence, if he/she receives compulsory education at the places
where his/her parents or other statutory guardians are working
or dwelling, the local people’s governments shall provide
him/her with equal conditions for receiving compulsory
education.115
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Riding the trend of decentralization, Article 12 leaves implementation
to local governments. 116 The provision goes on to say that “[t]he
concrete measures shall be formulated by provinces, autonomous
regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government.”117
The language in amended Article 12 still permits local
governments to attach conditions to enrollment in compulsory
education institutions that many migrant workers cannot satisfy. For
example, some local governments enforce rules to the effect that
parents must establish local domicile before their child can be
enrolled.118 Further, migrants are often still required to produce the
“five certificates”: temporary residence permits, work permits, proof
of residence, certificates from the migrant’s place of origin, and
household registration booklets.119 This continues despite a Human
Rights Watch report that stated up to 90% of families are unable to
obtain all of the five certificates. 120 Further, due to overcrowding,
urban schools frequently deny migrant workers the opportunity to
enroll regardless of whether they satisfied the “five certificate” criteria,
and enrolling in other public schools generally means they will need
to pay even higher out-of-district fees.121
C.

Local Governments Have Too Much Power to Interpret National
Education Laws and to Issue Their Own Education Regulations

As a result of growing decentralization, local governments can use
local regulations to defeat the purposes of laws and regulations from the
central government. 122 Local governments can formulate more specific
regulations that build on laws handed down from higher levels of
government. 123 Chinese law scholars have gone so far as to call local
regulations a weapon used to battle central government control. 124 This
disconnect between central government policies and local government
116
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practices contributes to the predicament migrant children in Chinese cities
face today.
D.

Discrimination Against Migrant Populations and Underfunding of
Schools Perpetuates the Problems Migrant Children Have In
Accessing Urban Public Schools

Discrimination and underfunding at the local level, among other
things, could explain why these accessibility problems persist despite the
central government’s numerous attempts to incorporate migrant children into
the public school system. Migrant workers in Chinese cities are stigmatized,
often portrayed by the media as “poor, dirty, ignorant and prone to
violence.”125 Migrant workers also face undue blame for rising crime rates
in cities, with “migrant crime” even considered a distinct category of
criminal activity.126 Furthermore, despite the fact that cheap migrant labor is
in high demand in Chinese cities, urban residents often view migrant
workers as an unwanted drain on public resources.127 Such discrimination
against the migrant community may help explain why local governments
resist incorporating migrant children into their school systems.
Discrimination is not the only reason local governments might want to
limit access to local hukou holders. Overcrowding already plagues many
urban public schools. 128 If local school systems are operating at full
capacity, there are few incentives for local government officials to open up
schools to a flood of new children. The combination of underfunding in
urban schools and discrimination against migrants explains why local
governments hesitate to incorporate migrant children into their public
schools.
E.

Incorporating Migrant Children into the State School System Will
Have Long Term Economic and Political Benefits for the Chinese
Government

Incorporating migrant children into the state school system will help
accomplish some of the goals laid out in China’s 12th five-year plan, a list of
the government’s current economic and social policy initiatives. In this
latest plan, the government declares its intention to boost service sector
125
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value-added output, foster indigenous innovation, increase social harmony,
and improve public services for urban and rural residents.129
A significant number of migrant children live in China’s cities. A
study done in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, found that 36% of
migrant workers living in the city moved with their children.130 Three broad
categories of arguments—human rights, economics, and politics—illustrate
why ignoring the educational needs of this population is both impractical
and unwise.
F.

Compulsory Education Is a Human Right that Both Urban and Rural
Migrant Populations Should Be Able to Access

Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that
“[e]veryone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in
the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be
compulsory.”131 Today the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, is considered customary
international law, 132 meaning states comply with the norm because they
believe it to have binding effects similar to any other law. 133 Migrant
children are no less Chinese than their urban counterparts, and they deserve
the same educational rights that the law guarantees to all Chinese children.
Education is a powerful tool. It gives children the means to improve their
own lives and to make valuable contributions to China’s economy, culture,
and society.134 Compulsory education should not be withheld from migrant
children because of their parents’ inability to obtain urban hukou.
Some may argue that children should be left at home where their
hukou enables them to receive an education. However, leaving children
behind in rural villages is not always a viable option, particularly when there

129
Key Targets of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, ENGLISH.NEWS.CN, Mar. 5, 2011,
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130
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is no one there to care for them.135 As discussed in Part II, many parents
leave the rural villages they grew up in because of the poor infrastructure
and lack of opportunity in these areas, hoping to share the promise of a
better life in the city with their children.136
Migrant parents who bring children to cities often work ten or more
hours a day, seven days a week, which leaves little free time to spend with
their children.137 If these children cannot attend school and are too young to
work, few opportunities exist for them to cultivate useful skills (intellectual,
interpersonal, and otherwise) that will make them productive citizens.
Furthermore, exclusion from state schools perpetuates perceptions of
inequality and discrimination that migrant children already feel, eroding
their self-confidence and making it harder for them to adapt to city life.138
Forcing migrant children to attend sub-par private institutions is not much
better, as it still amounts to a type of socio-economic and cultural
segregation139 that may further inflame cultural tensions between migrants
and urban residents.
Migrant workers contribute heavily to urban
140
development, and their children ought to receive the educational benefits
of city living.
G.

China Will Experience Long-Term Economic Benefits as a Result of
Incorporating Migrant Children into the State School System

Renowned economist Friederich Hayek, analysts at the World Bank,
and countless other scholars have documented education’s positive effects
on economic growth.141 Incorporating migrant children into urban public
schools will benefit China’s economy in several ways. First, it will put more
pressure on local governments to confront budgetary issues involved in the
administration of compulsory education, which can cut down on waste.
Second, small incentives like this will likely cause a modest uptick in ruralurban migration, a benefit to local economies, without opening the
floodgates and overwhelming urban infrastructure. Upon moving to urban
areas, rural residents typically do more economically productive work, make
135
See, e.g., Children of Migrant Workers Isolated in Cities, ENGLISH.NEWS.CN, Aug. 19, 2011,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-08/19/c_131061951.htm (documenting feelings of
loneliness and alienation felt by many migrant children residing in urban areas).
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more money, learn more skills, and purchase more goods than if they had
remained at home.142 Simultaneously, their presence boosts the demand for
urban infrastructure and housing, which can strengthen economic growth.143
Lastly, educating this large group of children will benefit China in its
transition to a service-based economy.
Local governments tend to distribute resources to compulsory
education based on the number of permanent residents residing within their
jurisdictions as opposed to the actual number of school-age children living in
the same area.144 This means that local governments do not need to take
migrant children—even migrant children who have lived in the same cities
since birth—into account when they disburse education funding. Examined
in another light, if these migrant children actually live in cities but their
hukous still reflect rural residence, the local governments in their home
villages are likely to be working with inaccurate numbers as well. This
creates a country-wide budgetary illusion—local governments in rural areas
are budgeting for more children than actually attend their schools while local
governments in urban areas are budgeting for far fewer children than are
legally eligible to attend their schools. The central government ought to
make changes to the compulsory education funding system in order to make
it more responsive to changing internal migration patterns, even if this
means reining in the decentralization of education funding that has been
occurring since the 1980s. If local governments are forced to admit legally
eligible children in their jurisdictions, it will put pressure on them to come to
terms with this budgetary mess.
Incorporating the migrant student population into the state school
system is in China’s economic self-interest and will yield short- and longterm benefits. First, doing so has the potential to increase migrant worker
productivity. Migrant workers with young children may not have as much
time to dedicate to employment. Compulsory education can provide dual
functions of building intellectual capacity and serving as childcare for
working parents. Parents who have children enrolled in school experience
better worker productivity, less absenteeism, and more focus on work-related
tasks. 145 Increased efficiency with respect to time allocation will bolster
short-term economic growth.
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Second, educating migrant children will build up China’s human
capital in the long term. Educated workers provide tangible assets in a
service-based economy. China’s recent minimum wage increases, some as
high as 23%, suggest the country is slowly moving away from low-cost
manufacturing, with foreign companies more frequently seeking out lower
cost countries such as Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Vietnam.146 Studies have
found that worker productivity is largely dependent on length and quality of
education.147 Also, educationally acquired cognitive skills are essential for
trainability and consequent skill achievements at work. 148 Individual
cognitive skills have significant effects on individual earnings and
countrywide economic growth. 149 China should adopt more inclusive
educational policies, keeping in mind that education encourages
metacognitive skills like problem solving and analysis, which are highly
transferrable 150 and likely to be valuable in all stages of economic
development. Reforming the educational system will prepare Chinese
citizens to enter the international service-based economy on equal footing
with other countries.
Third, providing compulsory education to migrant children will help
ensure that the migrant workers who are essential to urban economies will
stay and spend their money in the city instead of sending wages back to their
home provinces. Additionally, despite continued rural-urban migration,
some cities are reporting labor shortages.151 Some migrant workers, in the
face of rising inflation and institutional barriers such as hukou, are finding
the costs of city living too high.152 In response there were country-wide
minimum wage increases effective January 1, 2012 which indicate that
China does not want migrant workers to return to their rural hometowns
from urban industrial hubs.153 Large Chinese cities such as Beijing heavily
value rural-urban migration because their economies depend on the
continued availability of migrant labor.154 After all, migrant workers tend to
perform menial but necessary jobs that city residents do not see as
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desirable.155 Loosening hukou and “five certificate” based restrictions on the
education of migrant children could become a small incentive that tips the
balance in favor of city living once again, and may help ease the labor
shortages some Chinese cities are beginning to report.156 Duan Chengrong,
director of the Research Center for Population and Development at Renmin
University, claims the hukou system has not stopped rural-urban migration;
it has just meddled with urban labor markets.157 For urban areas to benefit
from rural-urban migration, migration policies should be responsive to the
needs of urban employers and not a culmination of arbitrary wealth and
education requirements. However, it should be noted that any loosening of
hukou restrictions should be accompanied by proper funding and planning so
that urban infrastructure will be able to accommodate the growing
population.
Fourth, incorporating migrant children into the state school system
can reduce economic inequality, which many experts consider “a major
stumbling block for domestic consumption to really take off in the long
run.”158 Domestic consumption made up 51.6% of China’s growth in 2011,
but its percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) pales in comparison to
other developed economies.159 The recent economic slowdown in China,
largely thought to be caused by weak export markets, is forcing the
government to look to domestic consumption to take up the slack.160 By
educating the large group of migrant children living in China’s cities, the
government will be tackling economic inequality and paving the way for
domestic consumption to grow in the long term.161
Finally, incorporating migrant children into the state educational
system would serve China’s goal of fostering more indigenous innovation.
As China’s economy develops and labor costs continue to rise, low-cost
manufacturing will drag down the country’s GDP. This is because much of
the technology manufactured in China was innovated and patented outside
of the country, meaning Chinese manufacturers must pay royalties which
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diminish their overall profits to foreign patent holders.162 Rising labor and
commodities prices will also continue to shrink Chinese manufacturers’
profits.163 If the government prioritizes educating as many Chinese children
as possible, it will effectively support the homegrown innovation that China
desires.
H.

Incorporating Migrant Children into State Schools Will Have Political
Benefits for the Chinese Communist Party by Soothing Social
Tensions and Tackling Growing Income Inequality

The Chinese government seeks to sustain the current trend of robust
economic growth while maintaining domestic social stability.164 These goals
are related, as domestic social stability creates a favorable environment for
continued economic growth.165
Education plays an important role in maintaining social stability
because of its ability to teach not only traditional subjects like math and
science, but also an increased tolerance for other cultures and alternative
methods of dispute resolution.166 Education also has the potential to create a
common value system shared across the populace. Studies conducted in
China have shown that poverty is related to under-development of
educational infrastructure. 167 Poorer areas with sub-par schools are more
likely to experience rapid population growth, strained economic
development, and ethnic tensions.168 Educating a person not only creates a
foundation for advanced economic utility, but also encourages rational
behavior and tolerance while discouraging fanaticism. 169 Education
inculcates students with valuable market-applicable skills as well as skills
that can be used to navigate the world around them in a tactful, nonconfrontational manner.
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Equal income distribution contributes to a country’s economic wellbeing. 170 Scholars have observed that “[e]ven when there are tradeoffs
between growth and equality in the short run, much . . . new research argues
that attention to inequality can bring significant long-run benefits for overall
economic growth.”171 Furthermore, recent case studies have shown that the
presence of political, social, and economic inequality increases the
likelihood of social unrest.172 In his 1999 speech to the World Bank, former
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan warned of the dangers of
horizontal inequality, a situation where “power and resources are unequally
distributed between groups that are also differentiated in other ways—for
instance by race, religion or language.”173 Horizontal inequality, measured
by distribution of assets and education, is a significant cause of social
unrest.174 Because migrant workers tend to be culturally distinct from other
urban residents,175 this theory dictates that China is at risk of social unrest
stemming from horizontal inequality. Opening up state schools to migrant
children is one method by which the government can tackle growing
inequality and dampen social unrest in China.
Many migrant workers already feel that the state mistreats them.176
They report police discrimination, bureaucratic manipulation, and
widespread corruption.177 For this population, a denial of access to social
services where they live and work does not merely deprive them
constitutional rights—it is often a matter of personal dignity. 178
Furthermore, migrant workers feel the sting of income inequality.179 Today
many migrant workers, instead of living in quaint rural villages with a small
spectrum of socioeconomic status, live in cities amongst China’s emerging
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middle and upper classes. 180 People assess their own well-being by
comparing themselves with others, making relative measures of wealth and
privilege just as important as absolute measures. 181 Although migrant
workers tend to earn more money in cities than in their rural hometowns,
living in cities lined with luxury boutiques and car dealerships surely
sharpens their grievances.
Perhaps more troubling for the Chinese government, this generation of
migrant workers is more inclined to engage in collective action to demand
their rights.182 Police mistreatment of a migrant worker in the summer of
2011 caused large-scale riots in which angry mobs of migrant workers
vandalized and torched traditional symbols of authority, such as government
offices and police vehicles.183 During these riots a prominent government
think-tank warned that if the huge population of migrant workers living in
China’s cities was not treated more fairly, this population would create
serious threat to domestic stability.184
Migrant workers resent being looked down upon in the places where
they work and live. Some migrant workers have even reported an eagerness
to find excuses to retaliate against the government.185 One area in which
migrant discontent is visible is in education. Because many migrant parents
cannot enroll their children in their cities’ public schools, they sometimes
turn to inferior private schools. 186 When these private schools are
demolished—typically in the name of urban renewal or various code
violations—many migrant parents see it as yet another form of
discrimination.187 Many of these closures have been met with protests.188
Some cities, such as Shanghai, attempt to alleviate tension by pairing these
demolitions with openings in state schools for displaced children. 189
However, for parents unable to gather the “five certificates” these openings
may not actually mean their children can enroll in local public schools.
Therefore these efforts do not succeed in appeasing all parents of ousted
children.
180
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Incorporating migrant children into the state school system would
have several positive political effects on Chinese cities. In the short term,
migrant parents would have less reason to protest and disrupt social stability.
Migrant children would also be given something productive to do during the
day while their parents work. In the long term, integration with local
children, as opposed to segregation into sub-par private institutions, would
build a sense of community that could eventually translate into less
discrimination against the migrant population as a whole. Chinese education
scholars have noted that “[i]f educational credentials increasingly matter in
the labor market and real opportunities for education are distributed
equitably across social groups, this rising role of human capital in the labor
market can be equalizing.”190 Educating migrant children will mean they
have a better opportunity to join and contribute to China’s growing middle
class instead of perpetuating the income inequality in China’s cities that is
surely a recipe for domestic instability.
IV.

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD PASS NEW EDUCATION
LEGISLATION, BOOST FUNDING, AND IMPROVE ENFORCEMENT

The central government must address several problems to make the
wide-scale incorporation of migrant children into state schools a reality.
First, the statutes and directives on the subject are drawn too broadly to be
effective. Second, urban schools already suffer from overcrowding and
must somehow confront the addition of hundreds of migrant children.
Finally, there are too few enforcement mechanisms to incentivize local
governments to comply with existing laws and regulations. Barring any
significant changes to China’s socio-political structure, this Part suggests
potential solutions that the central government could execute within the
existing framework.
A.

The Central Government Should Further Amend the CEA to Prevent
Local Governments from Requiring Unreasonable Documentation or
Charging Extra Fees for Enrolling Migrant Children

In line with the purposes of the 2006 amendments to the Compulsory
Education Act, Article 46 of the Chinese Constitution, and State Council
directives over the past two decades, migrant children should not face
unreasonable barriers to compulsory education. Migrant children should not
have to pay extra fees, nor should their parents need to present an unrealistic
190
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array of documentation, for their children to receive public compulsory
education. Further amendments to the CEA should emphasize these policies
in specific and binding language that should then be used in enforcement
proceedings against noncompliant school districts.
Because local
governments treat laws and regulations passed down by higher levels of
government as a floor and not a ceiling, 191 amendments must clearly and
comprehensively protect migrant children’s right to education in order to be
effective. The amended CEA should also require the Ministry of Education
to approve any student fees established by local school districts. This would
decrease the chances of local districts charging fees that theoretically would
apply to the entire student body, but realistically only apply to migrant
children, such as fees for not presenting the full “five certificates.”
Violations should result in stiff financial penalties. Legislation should also
establish a specialized reporting system to allow migrant families to
anonymously report non-compliant school districts to the Ministry of
Education in an efficient manner. Ideally this would result in targeted
investigations into the practices of reported school districts while lowering
the risk of retaliation against those who report violations.
Practical concerns indicate that China should maintain some form of
documentary requirement, because allowing migrant children into state
schools with no documentation at all could result in an administrative
nightmare. For example, parents passing through an urban center might
enroll children in schools just to pull them out several weeks later, creating a
disruptive learning environment. Additionally, children might be able to
attend schools in areas where their families do not actually live or work.
However, the “five certificate” requirement unduly burdens migrant workers
because it does not take into account the fact that many do not have formal
housing or employment contracts and find it hard to establish even
temporary residency because of the complicated and demanding government
procedures involved.192 Again, reports estimate that 90% of migrant parents
cannot acquire all of the “five certificates.” 193 Parents should be able to
prove, by whatever reasonable means possible, that they actually live in the
district in which they plan to enroll their children. Alternatives to the “five
certificate system” include solutions such as presenting records of social
security insurance payments, tax receipts, bills, or bank account statements.
191
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Further, presenting formal housing contracts alone should sufficiently prove
actual residence, but should not be the only acceptable means of proving
actual residence. In order to facilitate the transition to a new system in
which parents can choose their own means of proving actual residence, the
State Council should issue a detailed directive—or the Ministry of Education
should enact a detailed regulation—clarifying the types of documentary
evidence that constitute definitive proof of residency.
B.

The Central Government and Local Governments Should Allocate
More Funding to Education

Securing more funding for education will not only effectively ensure
future economic growth; it will also be politically popular because it aligns
with China’s Confucian roots. 194 In the seventh book of the Analects,
Confucius is quoted as saying, “I never refuse to teach anyone, not even
those so lowly they come offering nothing more but a few strips of dried
meat.”195 Though interpretations of this statement differ, modern scholars
see this statement as an expression of support for fairness and
nondiscrimination in education.196 Indeed, through most of its long history
China has held scholars in high esteem. The current government also seems
to embrace Confucian ideals, as evidenced by the establishment of a global
network of Confucius Institutes, tasked with promoting Mandarin dialects,
Chinese culture, and Confucianism around the world.197
Boosting education funding will also be politically popular because it
will provide benefits to the population as a whole. A 2010 survey conducted
by the All-China Women’s Federation found that the rising cost of education
was the number one source of familial conflict among those surveyed. 198
The central government could simultaneously alleviate countrywide familial
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stress and improve migrant children’s access to public schools by increasing
appropriations to lessen students’ tuition and miscellaneous fees.
China spends significantly less on education than most other middleincome countries. China spent 2.1% of its gross domestic product (“GDP”)
on education in 2011.199 In contrast, the United States spent 5.7% of its
GDP on education in 2011.200 Even compared to the world’s other three
major emergent (“BRIC”) countries, China’s education spending is on the
low side of the spectrum. In 2011 India spent 4.1%,201 Russia spent 3.1%,202
and Brazil spent 4.3% of its GDP on education.203 China should allocate
more funding to education not only to uphold the constitutional rights of
migrant children, but also because it is a sound economic investment with
the potential to bring greater social stability to urban areas.
Precedent exists for central and local government collaboration on
educational initiatives. In 2005, the central government and several
provincial governments cooperated on a project called “two frees, one
subsidy” where they jointly invested 7.2 billion yuan (approximately $1.14
billion USD) to improve access to compulsory education in impoverished
rural areas.204 The subsidies helped cover the cost of attendance fees and
textbooks, among other things, for poor rural families.205 Collaborations of
this sort will benefit central and local governments because they will both
enjoy the economic payoffs of such educational investments.
In China, investments in education produce dramatic returns,
especially in urban areas. 206 Chengdu, the bustling capital of Sichuan
Province, has invested significant funds recruiting quality teachers and
building new schools in the villages and towns surrounding the city. 207
Chengdu’s mayor, Ge Hongling, claims this effort has narrowed the urbanrural income gap, encouraged overall economic growth, and curbed some of
the problems associated with mass urban-rural migration.208
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Successful compliance with compulsory education laws will require
investment in three key arenas: urban schools, rural schools, and wider
enforcement of education laws and prosecution of violators. First, urban
schools must be physically able to accommodate incoming migrant children.
This means more classrooms, more educational materials, and more
teachers. Creating more space reduces incentives for school administrators
to sell off open slots to the highest bidder. Second, rural schools need better
funding so that migrant parents feel more comfortable leaving children in
their hometowns to be educated. This will not only benefit rural villages by
creating more jobs and building more human capital, but will also ease the
pressure on urban schools. Finally, the central government must allocate
funds for on-the-ground, periodic enforcement of compulsory education
laws.
C.

The Central Government and Local Governments Need to Increase
Enforcement of Relevant Laws on Educating Migrant Children

Although the amendments to the Compulsory Education Act and the
relevant State Council directives spell out a clear purpose—to fully
incorporate migrant children into the state school system—local
governments have found numerous ways around these measures.209 As the
ancient Chinese proverb goes, “the mountains are high and the Emperor is
far away.”210 Increased enforcement of compulsory education laws, coupled
with meaningful punishment of violators, will make the costs of noncompliance higher for local governments that were not previously
incentivized to incorporate migrant children into the public school system.
The Standing Committee of the NPC has the constitutional right to
interpret China’s Constitution and statutes.211 It may also “annul those local
regulations or decisions of the organs of state power of provinces,
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central
Government that contravene the Constitution, the statutes or the
administrative rules and regulations.” 212 The Standing Committee should
use its constitutional powers to annul local regulations that interfere with the
goal of full integration and make serious efforts to ensure that such
annulments are heeded in practice, perhaps with the Ministry of Education’s
assistance. Without real enforcement or stiff penalties for non-compliance,
209
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local governments could simply find ways around any new legislation
enacted to protect the educational rights of migrant children in their
jurisdictions.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that China knows how to educate children. In 2009
China participated alongside sixty-five other counties in the Programme for
International Student Assessment (“PISA”), a test that evaluates worldwide
educational systems by testing random samples of fifteen-year-old
students.213 In this round of testing, Shanghai had the highest average test
scores, beating out countries like the United States, Japan, and Germany.214
If the political willpower existed, China could use widespread education as a
tool to seamlessly transition from a country of manufacturers to a country of
innovators.
Moreover, the effective denial of compulsory education to the
children of migrant workers living in China’s cities is an unwise policy
choice for Chinese leaders. Incorporating migrant children into state schools
will help to soothe tensions between migrant workers and local residents by
building a sense of community and correcting the wide income distribution
between the two groups. This comment noted that Chinese cities heavily
depend on migrant labor.215 If the administrative barriers to life in the city
remain overly burdensome, migrant workers that otherwise add value to
urban economies may choose to stay home, exacerbating labor shortages that
Chinese cities have begun reporting.216
The central government is taking some positive steps to address the
social problems caused by the hukou system. A recent State Council circular
introduced a new policy whereby acquisition of urban hukou in small and
medium sized cities would be easier for applicants with stable jobs and
residences, provided they have paid social security insurance for at least one
year.217 Under this policy, migrant parents could also apply for urban hukou
on behalf of their unmarried children. 218 If this policy is earnestly
213
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implemented at the local government level, it could pave the way to more
inclusive urban public schools. However, this new policy does not address
the problems faced by migrant families living in major cities like Shanghai
and Beijing.
China wishes to continue its robust economic growth while
maintaining domestic social stability. 219 As the country departs from the
low-cost manufacturing model, the government needs to invest in the
creation of more human capital in order to compete with other service-based
economies on the global stage. 220 Educating the tens of thousands of
migrant children with no current access to the state school system221 is not
only a means to this end, it is a moral imperative.
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